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Abstract 
Corrupt  arrangements  are  characterized  by  a  high  risk  of 
opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer 
of  uncertainty  for  participants  in  corrupt  transactions.  This  paper 
demonstrates  how  legislators  can  use  an  asymmetric  design  of 
criminal  sanctions  to  amplify  these  inherent  risks,  thereby 
destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric 
penalties do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and 
that immunity may be a useful tool to disband the ‘pact of silence’ 
characteristic of corrupt arrangements. 
JEL Classification: K42, D73 
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1  Introduction 
Corrupt actors must be deterred from their criminal actions. But deterrence involves more 
than just the threat of suffering from legal sanctions. It encompasses the possibility of being 
cheated  by  one’s  counterpart;  besides,  deterrence  also  increases  with  the  risk  of  being 
denounced or extorted. These uncertainties can be amplified by designing criminal sanctions 
in a strategic way, aimed at enhancing opportunism. This paper investigates how differences 
in criminal sanctions may be exploited by lawmakers to destabilize corrupt arrangements. 
We  develop  a  simple  game-theoretic  approach  to  determine  for  which  acts  corrupt 
perpetrators should be penalized. At the core of the model lies the idea that partners in a 
corrupt transaction may cheat each other. They may renege on their promises and denounce a 
deal after it has been finalized. Unable to rely on legal recourse, corrupt partners face the 
challenging task of ensuring that each side sticks to the agreement. At the same time they are 
continuously tempted to betray each other. Such betrayal is a good thing from the point of 
view of society at large.  It assures that corruption is a troublesome business and induces 
potential participants to refrain from getting involved in corrupt arrangements. 
When public officials are paid with counterfeit money, as it recently happened in India, or are 
given fake antiques, as in China, they can no longer trust to be given “fair” treatment by 
bribers. The resulting insecurity may effectively deter them from asking for bribes/gifts in the 
future.
2 Similarly, when corrupt public servants renege on their promises, businesspeople may 
become  less  likely  to  continue  with  their  illegal  strategy,  [Husted  1994;  della  Porta  and 
Vanucci 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91-110; Lambsdorff 2002; Lambsdorff, Schramm and 
Taube 2005]. 
Courts  reject  the  enforcement  of  corrupt  agreements,  forcing  actors  to  explore  alternative 
safeguard  mechanisms  against  opportunism.  They  must  employ  methods  to  make  their 
agreements  self-enforcing.  Various  forms  of  institutional  solutions  come  into  play  and 
provide guidance to reform. Corrupt parties lacking trust in each other, for example, often use 
intermediaries.  Practical  insights  into  the  corrupt  dealings  of  intermediaries  have  recently 
been provided, [Aburish 1986; Andvig 1995; Moody-Stuart 1997; Bray 1999, 2004]. 
Pre-existing social relationships may lay the foundation for economic exchange by providing 
the required protection from opportunism. Social structure facilitates economic exchange by 
embedding individuals in long-term (personal) relationships (of trust), [Ogilvie 2004; Greif 
2005]. For members of a group, the advantages to be gained from honesty may outweigh the 
motivation to behave opportunistically or to denounce another member. Social structures and 
ties may thus facilitate the sealing also of corrupt deals, [Rose-Ackerman 1999: 98; Kingston 
2005]. 
In the course of established ongoing exchanges yet another mechanism to enforce corrupt 
agreements is at the disposal of business partners. Relationships of mutual trust and respect, 
formed by repeated legal exchange or hierarchical control, can be misused for striking corrupt 
agreements. Corrupt transactions may thus be embedded in a broader context of exchange, 
and legal transactions may act as ‘guarantors’ for corrupt deals. Once trusted relationships 
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have emerged and legal threats established, these can be exploited for securing corrupt side-
contracts.  Consequently,  the  threat  to  end  legal  relationships  may  effectively  prevent 
opportunism in corrupt arrangements, [Lambsdorff and Teksoz 2005]. 
To root out corruption, it may be necessary to shatter some of the confidence that goes along 
with  it,  i.e.  to  destroy  the  trust  that  corrupt  favors  will  be  reciprocated.  Fjeldstad  and 
Tungodden [2001] argue that the way customs services were downsized in Tanzania was a 
failure because those officials who were fired at a later stage became middlemen and created 
trusted  corrupt  relationships.  After  a  first  crackdown  on  corruption,  corrupt  networks 
revitalized  and  strengthened,  and  corruption  returned  to  its  original  level.  Apparently, 
strategies in fighting corruption may fail if they do not adequately take into consideration 
network ties and mechanisms that facilitate corruption. 
Acts of opportunism or denunciation are not uncommon. In fact, insiders are often a vital 
source of information for the prosecuting authorities, [Anderson 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 
53]. For those who decide to expose the deal miscellaneous motivations exist. For example, 
the largest company in France, Elf Aquitaine, allegedly setup an internal financial network 
aimed at providing funding for corrupt political purposes. This so-called “Investment Board” 
consisted of relatives and friends of the chairman of the board. This institution was well estab-
lished,  and  succeeded  for  a  while.  Yet  the  booting  out  of  one  member  put  an  end  to its 
operation. The outcast took his revenge, and denounced operations of the network.
3 Clearly, 
some  type  of  conflict  can  stimulate  one  party  to  take  revenge,  or  to  prefer  honesty  to 
involvement in illegal transactions. 
Another  motive  for  providing  information  on  illegal  transactions  may  also  result  from 
monetary  inducements  by  third  parties.  While  prosecutors  may  offer  crown  witnesses  a 
reward in exchange for inside information, private agents may also bid on such information, 
e.g. as a means to regain access to markets lost to corrupt competitors, [Rose-Ackerman 1999: 
56]. For the media it is common practice to pay  for tip-offs, enabling  them to report on 
political scandals. Crucial information about corruption by Benazir Bhutto and her husband in 
Pakistan was obtained from a collaborator in London. Pakistani prosecutors obtained these 
pieces of information in exchange for a payment of US$ 1 million.
4 As people can profit from 
obtaining such information for a variety of reasons, and may be willing to pay a price, a 
market emerges for inside information on corrupt agreements. 
That opportunism represents a substantial threat to informal contracting has recently been 
corroborated  by  laboratory  experiments.  In  some  experiments  participants  played  bribery 
games or faced problems similar to those explained above, for a comprehensive review see 
Dušek,  Ortmann  and  Lízal  [2004].  Drawing  on  the  gift-exchange  literature,  Abbink, 
Irlenbusch and Renner [2000] let two participants hope for reciprocity when exchanging gifts. 
In case of defection, one of them can spend resources on punishment. Game theory would 
predict  that  such  punishment  would  not  be  carried  out  because  it  does  not  increase  the 
punisher’s income. Expecting that sanctions will not be imposed, the other player would have 
no incentive to return a gift. This suggests that none of the participants gives gifts in the first 
place.  However,  contrary  to  game-theoretical  predictions,  retribution  is  found  to  be  quite 
common.  Reciprocity,  though,  was  less  common  because  a  “fair”  amount  was  often  not 
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returned. Dušek, Ortmann and Lízal [2004: 5] summarize that “hostile actions are consistently 
punished while the friendly ones are less consistently rewarded.” 
In this paper we shall investigate how legislators may set criminal sanctions to knock corrupt 
deals off balance. We demonstrate for which element of a corruption offense perpetrators 
should  be  penalized  in  order  to  foster  opportunism  and  denunciation.  We  propose  the 
following asymmetric design: expected criminal sanctions for accepting gifts should be low 
and those for illicitly providing favors high; in turn, expected penalties for giving gifts aimed 
at  achieving  influence  should  be  severe  (with  a  provision  for  leniency),  while  those  for 
accepting illegal favors mild. 
The rationale behind asymmetry in penalties has already been taken up by Rose-Ackerman 
[1999: 53]: “Successful detection of corruption depends on insiders to report wrongdoing. 
Often this requires officials to promise leniency to one of the participants.” Yet, in most 
countries legal sanctions are imposed roughly symmetrically on both gift-givers and takers. 
We  contest  this  symmetric  design  and  argue  that  some  of  the  skepticism  surrounding 
asymmetry may not stand up to a careful analysis. Section 2 develops the model and presents 
the results. Section 3 discusses policy implications in light of the German legal code and their 
juristic justifications. Section 4 concludes. 
2  The Model 
In the subsequent one-shot game there are two rational, risk-neutral players: a recipient of a 
gift, e.g. a public official (player “O”), and a gift-giver, e.g. a businessperson (player “F”). O 
is in the position to place a public contract, award a license or grant a permit whose value for 
F is denoted by V . 
Because those seeking influence usually have to move first by giving gifts, we assume that 
opportunistic behavior, i.e. failing to reciprocate, is primarily an option for O. This appears to 
be the standard sequence, evidenced in most cases of corruption. Sometimes also O may 
move first, providing favors before being given a gift. F would then have the opportunity to 
behave opportunistically by failing to give the gift. However, this sequence seems to be the 
exception rather than the rule. One theoretical justification for our assumption arises when 
bureaucrats enjoy a monopoly position in placing contracts, awarding licenses or granting 
permits. Given that businesspeople at times compete for preferential treatment by deploying 
illegal means, the bureaucrats may easily shift the risk of opportunism to the private sector. 
Besides behaving opportunistically, both players may expose the other side. F may be induced 
to blow the whistle by being offered a considerable monetary payment, coupled, for instance, 
with the expectation of favorable treatment by a political opposition party coming to power in 
the aftermath of the corruption scandal. F may also gain from denunciation by sending an 
unmistakable signal to other government officials that opportunistic behavior on their part 
will not be tolerated, thereby stabilizing future corrupt deals; or F may just denounce as one 
mode of retaliation after being cheated by O. We capture the gross payoff accruing to F from 
denunciation by the term  f D , with  [ ] f f f D ; D D ∈ , and  f D  denoting the minimum and  f D  
denoting the maximum gross payoff. Note, however, that  f D  does not take in legal benefits 
arising from denunciation, e.g. mitigation of a sentence or immunity. We include these in the 
respective criminal sanctions. 
O, on the other hand, may assume the role of a (fake) agent provocateur, soliciting gifts only 
for the purpose of denunciation. O may also decide to denounce if the gift offered by F is of         4 
too low a value, [della Porta and Vanucci 1999: 195].
5 Additionally, O may be induced to 
denounce F by receiving a monetary payment or by being promised a lucrative position, e.g. 
by F’s competitors who wish to regain market access; or O may receive a bonus from her 
superior. O may also blow the whistle in expectation of a payoff resulting from the social 
standing of being a person of principles, [Lambsdorff 2000: 225], thereby eventually reducing 
the probability of detection in future corrupt deals. We capture the gross payoff accruing to O 
from denunciation by the term  o D , with  [ ] o o o D ; D D ∈ , and  o D  denoting the minimum and 
o D  denoting the maximum gross payoff. Note again that  o D  does not entail any payoff that 
may arise from denunciation, e.g. from mitigation of a sentence or immunity. 
In  any  event,  both  F  and  O  would  have  to  weigh  the  benefits  from  opportunism  and 
denunciation against their potential drawbacks. For example, both players could lose future 
income from corrupt deals. Moreover, social sanctions may be imposed. That is, possible 
social ties between O and F might be torn apart; or a social group may penalize the respective 
player for disobeying the rules of reciprocity, [Kingston 2005]. In our game we focus on these 
social costs to highlight that the failure to abide by the rules of reciprocity may be socially 
sanctioned. The costs are captured by the terms  o S 0 ≥  (social costs incurred by O) and  f S 0 ≥  
(social costs incurred by F). 
Obviously, legal sanctions also have to be borne in mind. In our game there are four offenses 
that may be subject to criminal sanctions. O may be punished for illicitly supplying favors to 
F, denoted by 
A
o S 0 ≥ . Additionally, O may be penalized for the acceptance of a gift, denoted 
by 
B
o S 0 ≥ . Laterally reversed, on F criminal sanctions may be levied for the acceptance of the 
illicit favor, and for giving a gift, captured by 
A
f S 0 ≥  and 
B
f S 0 ≥ , respectively. 
We assume that there exist optima 
A S  and 
B S  for the total criminal sanctions for each fact of 
a case, i.e. 
A A A
o f S S S + =  and 
B B B
o f S S S + = . The respective optimal levels may relate to the 
risk of detection and the advantage obtained by illegal action, [Rose-Ackerman 1999: 54-55], 
or to the size of the damage imposed on society, i.e. to the severity of the offense. Since 
Becker  [1968],  research  has  mostly  focused  on  determining  the  optimal  level  of  these 
penalties, 
A S  and 
B S . We are primarily interested in how a given level of 
A S  and 
B S  should 
be divided among perpetrators. 
Figure 1 captures the one-shot game in its extensive form, see Kingston [2005: 7] for an 
extensive-form basic model. At the start of the game, F chooses either to seek influence by 
giving a gift (action b) or to stay out of the corrupt arrangement (action nb). In case F gives 
the gift, nature (N) determines O’s gross payoff from denunciation,  o D . 
After nature has determined  o D , O makes her choice. She decides either to denounce (action 
d) or to remain silent (action nd). If O chooses d, the corrupt arrangement is exposed and O’s 
net payoff is 
B
o o o D B S S + − − ; F receives 
B
f B S − − . The game ends. If O decides on nd, she 
has the option either to hand out the favor (action a) or to renege (action na). 
                                                 
5 However, in our model setup such a situation cannot occur because the official chooses the type of gift (level of 
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Figure 1: One-Shot Game and Payoffs (O; F) 
Nature (N) now plays again by “sending out” investigative journalists or members of the 
opposition party, who provide incentives to F for denunciation. These incentives,  f D , coupled 
with the potential profits and losses, determine F’s net payoff.
6 If F blows the whistle (action 
d) after having obtained the favor,  V , he faces both 
A
f S  and 
B
f S  for sure. We subtract the 
value of the gift,  B, from F’s payoff and assume that F may additionally incur social costs, 
f S , for his unfair behavior. O, on the other hand, would be punished with certainty for taking 
gifts, 
B
o S , as well as for illicitly supplying favors, 
A
o S , and must subtract these penalties from 
the  value  of  the  gift,  B.  The  ensuing  net  payoffs  are 
A B
o o B S S − −   and 
A B
f f f f D V B S S S + − − − − . 
If F does not denounce (action nd), social costs,  f S , are not incurred and legal penalties are 
imposed only if the deal were randomly detected with probability  f p . By the same token, O 
would face legal penalties only if she were detected. We allow for this probability,  o p , to 
differ from that for F, because internationally operating and mobile businesspeople (or firms) 
may  escape  prosecution  more  easily  as  opposed  to  locally  employed  and  settled  public 
                                                 
6 We treat  f D  symmetrically both if action a or na was chosen by O because, without loss of generality, we 
assume that the investigative journalists, for instance, do not know which action was taken.         6 
servants.
7  This  assumption  is  immaterial  to  our  results,  though.  The  net  payoffs  are 
( )
A B
o o o B p S S − +  and  ( )
A B
f f f V B p S S − − + . 
If O behaved opportunistically (action na), F would face a penalty only for gift-giving, 
B
f S , 
but not for accepting the favor, 
A
f S , which he did not receive. O would pocket the gift and is 
punished with certainty only for taking the gift, yet also incurs social costs,  o S , because of her 
failure to respect the informal rules of reciprocity. If F denounces (action d) the net payoffs 
are 
B
o o B S S − −  and 
B
f f D B S − − . If F abstained from denunciation (action nd), he would suffer 
from (1) having given the gift without receiving the favor, and (2) from legal sanctions for 
gift-giving, imposed with probability  f p . O would have to endure the corresponding legal 
punishment with probability  o p  and the social costs,  o S , with certainty. The ensuing net 
payoffs are 
B
o o o B p S S − −  and 
B
f f B p S − − .  
According  to  the  sequence  of  the  game,  F’s  gross  (and  net)  payoff  from  denunciation  is 
unknown to O at the stage she has to decide between action a or na. Yet, V , B, 
A
f S , and 
B
f S  
are common knowledge.
8 For O information on these parameters is vital to her evaluation of 
the risk of denunciation on part of F and, thus, to her decisions in the game. If O provides the 
favor, F prefers to denounce if 
(1)  ( ) ( )( )
A B A B A B
f f f f f f f f f f f f D V B S S S V B p S S D 1 p S S S + − − − − > − − + ⇔ > − + + , 
i.e. if the expected net payoff from denunciation is positive. Accordingly, there is a critical 
value,  ( )( )
* A B
f, f f f f D 1 p S S S = − + + a ,  that,  if  exceeded,  makes  denunciation  profitable.  O 
estimates the probability of denunciation,  π, based on her knowledge of the distribution of 
*
f, D a: 
(2)  ( )
*
f, f f π P D D D a = ≤ ≤ . 
In turn, if O does not provide the favor, F prefers to denounce if  
(3)  ( )
B B B
f f f f f f f D B S B p S D 1 p S − − > − − ⇔ > − . 
( )
* B
f, f f D 1 p S na = −  represents the critical value if O chooses to renege. Thus, O’s estimated 
risk of denunciation, λ, is 
(4)  ( )
*
f, f f λ P D D D na = ≤ ≤ . 
Since 
* *
f, f, D D a na > , one observes that  π λ < , i.e. the risk of denunciation is lower if O does 
not behave opportunistically. The reason for this effect is twofold. On the one hand, if F 
                                                 
7 Even if the actual probabilities of detection were symmetric, the probabilities of conviction may not be. 
8 Criminal sanctions are common knowledge because they are laid down in the respective legal texts.         7 
denounces in spite of obtaining the favor, he incurs additional social costs,  f S . On the other 
hand, F would be criminally liable for the illicit acceptance of the favor, which further reduces 
the likelihood of denunciation. 
Both  π and  λ enter O’s calculation of what to do, i.e. either to provide the favor or not, 
respectively. O’s expected payoff from supplying the favor is    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
A B A B A B
o o o o o o o o o π B S S 1 π B p S S B π p πp S S − − + − − + = − + − + .  
Her expected payoff from reneging is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
B B B
o o o o o o o o o λ B S S 1 λ b p S S B λ p λp S S − − + − − − = − + − − . 
Thus, O prefers to provide the return if  
( )( ) ( )
A B B
o o o o o o o o B π p πp S S b λ p λp S S − + − + > − + − − ,  
i.e., if  
(5)  ( )( ) ( )
B A
o o o o o o λ π 1 p S S π p πp S − − + > + − .  
Observe that  ( )( ) o λ π 1 p 0 − − ≥  and  ( ) o o π p πp 0 + − ≥ . Accordingly, both a high 
A
o S  and a 
low 
B
o S  induce opportunism. For society at large this is a good thing because it discourages F 
from gift-giving. 
From the perspective of destabilizing corrupt arrangements 
A
o S  should thus be high because a 
public  servant  who  accepts  gifts  may  be  effectively  deterred  from  returning  the  favor  if 
precisely  this  action  is  severely  penalized.  Opportunism  would  be  enhanced  due  to  the 
uncomfortable choice arising for a public servant after taking gifts. 
B
o S , on the other hand, 
should be as low as possible. In fact, the elimination of 
B
o S , i.e. 
B
o S 0 = , would initiate a strong 
incentive  for  officials  to  behave  opportunistically.  In  contrast,  rigorously  penalizing  an 
official for accepting gifts may backfire as the corrupt partners may be squeezed into a ‘pact 
of silence’ as the official would be placed at the mercy of the businessperson. However, if no 
criminal sanctions are imposed on the official for taking gifts, the official has ample scope to 
renege on her promises without fearing denunciation by the businessperson. 
An illustrative case how a high 
B
o S  may backfire is reported in Lambsdorff [2002: 263]. At a 
court in the city of Bochum, Germany, an employee of the local road construction authority 
confessed to accepting bribes for contracts relating to marking roads. Beginning in 1987, and 
lacking business experience, he passed on names of competing firms in a public tender. After 
this incident, he received an envelope filled with DM 2.000 (EUR 1.000) from the private 
firm who obtained the favor. “Suddenly I knew that I had begun to be at his mercy”, was the 
explication given in court and the justification for why he afterwards became entrapped in this 
corrupt relationship. The minor mistake of the public servant may have allowed to impose on 
him the criminal sanction 
B
o S . The pending sanction then operated as a guarantee for future 
corrupt deals.         8 
The case exemplifies that eliminating 
B
o S  would give O the chance to get out of the corrupt 
arrangement by denouncing F without having to fear prosecution – thereby increasing the 
probability  of  detection  and  conviction  for  F.  An  asymmetric  sanctioning  design  for  the 
official would therefore lead to a reduced willingness to participate in the corrupt deal on part 
of the businessperson. 
As the right-hand side of inequality (5) indicates, reneging becomes more likely if  π λ −  is 
low. But  π decreases with 
A
f S , as shown in (1) and (2). Setting 
A
f S 0 =  thus increases the 
incentive for O to behave opportunistically. Hence, we posit that the criminal sanction for 
accepting  an  illicit  favor, 
A
f S ,  should  be  eliminated  because  punishing  F  for  accepting 
reciprocal favors would backfire. F’s willingness to blow the whistle would arise only if he 
were cheated, and be reduced if he faced severe penalties for accepting the favor. Yet, F 
should retain his readiness to denounce a deal even if he has already accepted the favor. O, on 
the other hand, should not be able to lower the risk of whistle-blowing by handing out the 
favor, because this would stabilize the corrupt arrangement. 
What about 
B
f S ? According to inequalities (1) and (3), a high 
B
f S  makes denunciation less 
likely. On the other hand, a high sanction for gift-giving would deter F from participating in 
the deal in the first place. Hence, there seems to be a trade-off between destabilization on the 
one hand, and deterrence in its strict legal meaning (i.e. the threat of suffering from legal 
sanctions)  on  the  other  hand.  Yet,  the  authorities  can  avoid  this  pitfall  by  allowing  for 
mitigation of a sentence or outright immunity relating to 
B
f S . 
In order to destabilize the corrupt arrangement, exemption from punishment must be granted 
to F only if O has already supplied the favor. In other words, immunity should result only if O 
has chosen to award the contract, license or permit – and not if O has fudged on supplying the 
favor. This would ensure that F could not credibly threaten O that he had better not renege, 
thereby stabilizing the arrangement. Formally, this differentiation may be incorporated in the 
model  by  distinguishing  between  a  penalty  levied  on  F  for  giving  gifts  if  the  favor  was 
provided, 
B
f , S a ,  and  a  penalty  imposed  on  F  if  O  reneged, 
B
f , S na.  If  we  now  set 
B
f , S 0 a = , 
inequalities (1) and (3) imply that π increases while λ remains unaffected. This, according to 
(5), would additionally increase the likelihood of opportunism by O. 
A further fine-tuning would be achieved if leniency, i.e. 
B
f , S 0 a = , would be granted only if F 
actively contributed by denouncing the deal. The regular penalty, 
B B
f , f S S na = , would instead be 
imposed in case of random detection. Formally, this can be seen by inserting 
B B
f f , S S 0 a = =  
into  the  left-hand  side  and 
B B B
f, f, f S S S a na = =   into the  right-hand  side  of  inequality  (1).  (1) 
changes to 
(1’)     ( )
B A B
f f f f f D V B S S V B p S S + − − − > − − + , 
and  F  denounces  if  ( )
A B
f f f f f f D 1 p S p S S > − − + .  Clearly,  π  increases  while  λ  remains 
unchanged (because inequality (3) does not change). As a result, O’s incentive to break her 
promise is amplified because the risk of suffering  from criminal sanctions is higher if  O 
decides to abide by the rules of reciprocity than if she does not (see inequality (5)). 
Following our statements, we make three propositions.         9 
 
Propositions:  In  order  to  destabilize  corrupt  arrangements  (expected)  criminal  sanctions 
  should be levied asymmetrically on offenders.  
    Sanctions  for  illicitly  providing  favors  should  be  high,  whereas  those  for 
  accepting favors low (zero): 
A A
o S S =  and 
A
f S 0 = . 
    Sanctions for gift-taking should be low (zero), whereas those for gift-giving 
  severe (with a provision for leniency if the gift-giver denounces that the gift-
  taker has provided the favor): 
B
o S 0 =  and  {
B B S
f 0 S = . 
3  Policy Implications – The German Case 
In most countries criminal sanctions for bribery tend to be symmetric. One notable exception 
is Taiwan, where only those taking gifts/bribes are penalized, [Hepkema and Booysen 1997]. 
In Germany symmetry – laid out in §§331-334 of the German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch) – 
prevails  because  law  scholars  treat  the  purity  of  the  administrative  authorities  or  the 
objectivity of governmental decisions as the subject of protection, [Bannenberg 2002: 18-19]. 
It is argued that both parties in a corrupt deal jeopardize the subject of protection similarly 
and should thus be punished equally. Such symmetry follows from Article 3 of the German 
basic law (Grundgesetz). Put simply, Article 3 implies that equal facts of a case have to be 
tied to equal legal consequences, and unequal facts of a case have to be tied to different legal 
consequences. 
However, reasoning that both parties equally interfere with the subject of protection is not 
indisputable. Indeed, it is only to a minor extent that accepting gifts leads to political harm or 
economic losses. Rather, it is the act of illicitly handing out favors that endangers society’s 
trust in the integrity of public office, distorts allocative efficiency, or annuls fair competition. 
Likewise, it is not the  willingness to  accept illicit favors that distorts  decisions in public 
office, but a gift-giver’s initiative to sidestep competition by offering sweeteners. From this 
perspective, symmetry is not the self-evident and logical consequence. Rather, an asymmetric 
design of sanctions would be plausible. 
It might also be argued that asymmetric sanctions are incompatible with the goal of deterrence 
because the cancellation of sanctions may reduce the inhibition of criminal behavior by fear 
of punishment. This objection does not withstand a careful analysis, though. To see why, one 
has to look at the payoffs if neither denunciation nor opportunism is relevant. In this case O 
obtains  ( )
A B
o o o B p S S − + , while F’s expected profit is  ( )
A B
f f f V B p S S − − + . As long as the 
sum of both payoffs is positive, there exists a level for the value of the gift,  B, that ensures 
that each of the two payoffs is positive. Thus, for deterrence to prevail, it is crucial that the 
sum of the two terms is negative, i.e. that  ( ) ( )
A B A B
f f f o o o V B p S S B p S S 0 − − + + − + < , which, 
given  that 
A A A
o f S S S + =   and 
B B B
o f S S S + = ,  can  be  rewritten  as 
( ) ( )( )
A B A B
f o f o o V p S S p p S S 0 − + − − + < . 
A  negative  effect  of  asymmetric  penalties  on  deterrence  could  only  be  imagined  in  rare 
instances.  For  instance,  setting   
B
o S 0 =   reduces  deterrence  if  random  detection  and 
penalization is more likely for O than for F, i.e. if  o f p p 0 − > . This adverse outcome could         10 
probably be balanced by increasing 
A
o S . However, detecting the illicit exchange of favors may 
be more difficult for prosecutors than uncovering the illicit flow of money (gifts). In this 
situation, which is beyond the construction of our model, the increase in 
A
o S  would fall short 
of bringing about the same effects of deterrence. 
With  that  caveat  in  mind,  the  advantageous  effect  of  asymmetric  sanctions  on  inhibiting 
criminal behavior should be highlighted. Given the risk of denunciation and opportunism, 
there  emerge  additional  deterrent  effects.  Gift-givers  would  be  dissuaded  from  entering 
corrupt arrangements not only because of expected legal sanctions, but also because public 
servants are unreliable  partners in corrupt transactions. Thus, we are hinting at a broader 
concept of deterrence, i.e. one that does not exclusively relate to the expected disutility from 
exposure to legal punishment, as implied for instance in Becker [1968], Polinsky and Shavell 
[1984;  1999],  Posner  [1985],  Shavell  [1987,  1990],  and  Carlsmith,  Darley  and  Robinson 
[2002]. In fact, our model suggests that deterrence, in the broader sense of reducing potential 
perpetrators’ willingness to participate in illegal acts, also entails the disincentives created by 
a specific design of the relevant criminal sanctions. It is this deterrent effect that legal codes 
can  legitimately  draw  upon  by  devising  criminal  sanctions  asymmetrically  in  order  to 
destabilize corrupt arrangements. 
In  contrast  to  §371  (1)  of  the  German  tax  code  (Abgabenordnung  des  Steuerstrafrechts; 
‘corrected return in case of tax evasion’), §§331-334 do not provide for immunity and thus 
not  for  active  repentance  if  an  offender  calls  off  or  denounces  a  corrupt  deal  before  the 
authorities  institute  inquiries  or  uncover  the  deal.  What  is  more,  the  attempt,  i.e.  the 
“potentially  harmful  act  that  does  not  happen  to  result  in  harm”  [Shavell  1990:  435],  to 
commit  crimes  related  to  §§331-334  makes  offenders  liable  to  prosecution  according  to 
German adjudication. As a result of both the lack of immunity and the criminalization of 
attempts,  there  are  no  real  incentives  for  perpetrators  to  exit  a  corrupt  arrangement  –  as 
highlighted also by the case of the employee of the local road construction authority in the 
city of Bochum described earlier. 
From a criminological perspective, though, granting immunity in case of active repentance 
may be reasonable. First, immunity may increase uncertainty and may possibly break the 
‘pact of silence’ characteristic for corrupt arrangements, [Bannenberg 2002: 425]. This result 
was demonstrated in detail in the previous section. Indeed, the elimination of 
B
o S  and 
A
f S   in 
its  effect  is  materially  equal  to  granting  immunity,  because  one  ultimately  refrains  from 
criminal prosecution in both cases. Second, by the autonomous and voluntary withdrawal of 
the offender, legal peace
9 may again be reconstituted and further harm avoided, [Bannenberg 
2002: 424]. From this perspective the special- and general-preventive necessity to take penal 
action against offenders actively repenting may not exist, [Bannenberg 2002: 424]. Granted, 
mitigation  of  a  sentence  and  outright  immunity  are  often  guaranteed  by  the  prosecuting 
authorities ex post. But somebody trying to escape a corrupt arrangement cannot be sure that 
he will be spared – let alone for which acts he will be pardoned. Thus, what is missing in 
§331-334 is the kind of legal ex ante certainty guaranteed in §371. 
Hence, we propose not only the elimination (or non-prosecution) of some corruption offences, 
but also anti-corruption laws to be selectively amended by articles providing for immunity. In 
particular, in order to undermine the trust in reciprocity, we suggest to grant immunity for 
                                                 
9 Legal peace refers to the notion that the legal system is not interfered with.          11 
gift-giving, 
B
f S , conditional that the favor (contract, license, permit) has been supplied by the 
public servant and that the gift-giver denounces this act. 
Questions remain about exactly what criminal sanctions and immunity ought to encompass, 
but also about potential civil litigation and the ensuing indemnifications. May the gift-giver, 
for instance, retain the illicit favor? Or may the gift-taker keep the gift? Three possibilities 
arise with regards to the gift-giver, for example. First, F keeps the favor in case of both 
denunciation and random detection.
10 Second, F loses the favor in case of both denunciation 
and  random  detection.  Then,  obviously,  the  destabilizing  effects  described  above  would 
decrease, ceteris paribus, because F would have to surrender his ill-gotten contract. Formally, 
this can bee seen by looking at how inequality (1) changes. The favor,  V , is taken from F if 
he denounces; if F chooses not to denounce, he could keep the favor only if he were not 
detected. Thus, 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
A B A B A B
f f f f f f f f f f f f f D B S S S 1 p V B p S S D 1 p V S S S − − − − > − − − + ⇔ > − + + + . 
Since ( )( ) ( )( )
A B A B
f f f f f f f f 1 p V S S S 1 p S S S − + + + > − + + ,  π would drop. Still, even under this 
set  of  circumstances  the  asymmetric  design  of  criminal  sanction  may  serve  as  an 
encouragement to opportunism and whistle-blowing. The third possibility would be to have F 
keep the favor only if he denounces. Along the argumentative lines with regards to 
B
f S  this 
option would destabilize the corrupt arrangement (even further). 
Yet, allowing the gift-giver to keep the favor is extremely controversial. Imagine, for instance, 
that  a  firm  provides  sub-standard  quality  in,  say,  road  construction.  It  would  not  be  in 
society’s interest to have that firm build roads. Similar controversies come about if public 
servants are allowed to keep the gifts they were given – even though it would enhance their 
opportunism if they could keep the gift in case they did not award the contract, license or 
permit. These questions, however, go beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the 
design of criminal sanctions. 
4  Conclusion 
Asymmetric  sanctions  and  immunity  increase  the  risk  inherent  in  corrupt  deals  because 
opportunism and denunciation are furthered. As a result, participation becomes less likely. 
Moreover,  given  the  lack  of  legal  enforcement,  transaction  costs  might  increase  as  more 
complex and thus costlier safeguard mechanisms have to be sought, [Lambsdorff 2002]. 
Some  caveats  have  to  be  borne  in  mind,  though.  Foremost,  it  may  be  very  difficult  for 
prosecutors to establish the link between the favor and the gift, i.e. to prove the quid pro quo, 
because of complex and subtle payment/gift-exchange schemes coupled with long time spans. 
Imagine, for instance, that prosecutors can prove that a gift has been given, yet cannot connect 
the gift to a specific favor. Following the aforementioned policy prescriptions, the gift-giver 
would  be  penalized  for  exerting  influence  on  the  official;  yet  the  gift-taker  would  go 
unpunished. A similarly undesirable outcome would result in the following  case. Various 
firms are bidding for a public contract. The official responsible for awarding the contract 
                                                 
10 This is the case in our game, as indicated by the payoffs.         12 
threatens the firm with the best chances to reveal confidential information to its competitors 
so that these could make a better offer – unless the firm gives her a gift. Again, only the 
firm/businessperson  would  be  sanctioned  since  it  would  be  very  hard  to  prove  that  the 
contract was placed only because of the gift (the firm/businessperson had the best chances 
anyway). Both outcomes are detrimental because the gift-taker is not punished for the harm he 
imposes on society. This issue, however, may be balanced if immunity is given to the gift-
giver  in  exchange  for  providing  evidence  that  the  public  servant  has  reciprocated.  The 
difficulty in  establishing the quid pro quo would thus be alleviated by  the design of our 
penalties. 
While  these  and  other  objections  against  asymmetric  sanctions  and  immunity  definitely 
deserve consideration, others seem to be unjustified. In particular, asymmetry and immunity 
are not necessarily contrary to the respective laws’ subject of protection. Neither is there a 
conflict with the objective of general prevention. In fact, asymmetric criminal sanctions and 
immunity  might  unleash  higher  deterrent  effects  of  anti-corruption  laws,  if  deterrence  is 
understood in the broader sense of reducing potential perpetrators’ willingness to participate 
in illegal acts. Thus, in order to clamp down more vigorously on corruption, legislators should 
seriously  consider  the  benefits  of  asymmetric  sanctions  and  immunity  in  their  (re-) 
formulation of the respective anti-corruption laws. 
         13 
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